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1. Introduction and motivation 
 
After many decades of empirical research, there is no doubt that education is, on average, a 
profitable investment. A general agreement exists that besides being profitable, education is 
also a risky investment. At least two possible sources of risk can be found. First, a priori 
individuals may not be able to evaluate if their abilities will suffice to successfully complete 
the chosen level of education. And second, even if the educational process is completed 
successfully, they do not know where in the earnings distribution they will end up. In this 
paper we study the effect that this second source of risk (earnings uncertainty) exerts on 
wages. To the extent that the individual cannot ensure his/her returns to schooling and the 
variance of earnings is not constant across education, the risk premium in wages becomes as 
important as the average returns. While the latter has been widely studied, the risk premium 
has received little attention. Even though risk has been accounted for in several theoretical 
models, it has rarely been tested in an empirical context. Theory suggests that if risks are 
foreseeable they should be compensated for. The small empirical evidence on this subject 
confirms this theory1. Moreover, Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) claim that individuals 
display preference for a skewed earnings distribution, since they appreciate the low 
probabilities to obtain substantial incomes. Thus, in addition to testing the existence of risk 
compensation in wages, we also try to find evidence for what they call skewness 
“affection”. 
 
Previous works dealing with risk compensation in wages have estimated risk as the variance 
in earnings by occupation cells. Skewness is measured in a similar way. In an attempt to 
assess risk compensation in wages more accurately, Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) used 
occupation-education level cells. In this paper we are able to measure the risk and skewness 
of the earnings associated with the type of education only. We use a variable containing a 
detailed description on the highest educational level reached by Danes. We consider that a 
risk measure based only on education cells is closer to the true risk associated with the 
schooling investment. When the investment decision is made, individuals do not know their 
future occupation only their education. With observations by schooling type, there is no 
problem of selective mobility that beset observations by occupation as used by Hartog and 
Vijverberg (2002) to generate sufficient observations on risk. Thus, our data base 
 
1 King (1974), Feinberg (1981), McGoldrick (1995), and Hartog, Plug, Diaz-Serrano and Vieira (2003). 
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constitutes by itself a substantial improvement over previous empirical literature. We allow 
for the fact that within a given schooling level, both returns and risk may vary across 
educational types. For example, it is plausible that earnings distributions within the fields of 
Economics and Law, which attract more students, differ from those in for instance 
Engineering.  
 
Taking as baseline the work in Hartog and Vijberberg (2002), in this paper we attempt to 
provide new empirical evidence on risk compensation in wages using Danish data. In 
contrast to previous literature dealing with this subject that reports evidence mainly based 
on cross-section data, we use a panel consisting of a 10 percent sample of the whole Danish 
population aged 16 and above observed during 17 years (about 500,000 observations per 
year). Using such a big panel allows us to separate permanent from transitory shocks in 
earnings, and to test if risks arising from both types of shocks are compensated for and in 
what manner.  At the same time, our dataset also allows to experiment with new measures 
of risk based on earnings mobility. Thus, our contribution is not only based on the use of a 
wide range of educational types in measuring risk, but also on introducing a new dynamic 
dimension in the estimation of risk compensating differentials. Our results confirm the 
existence of such compensation in wages. With the aims described above, the remainder of 
the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the existing literature dealing with 
risk, education and wages. In section 3 we develop a simple model on risk compensating 
differentials. Section 4 provides a detailed description of the data used throughout this 
paper. Section 5 describes the risk measures used and reports the empirical results. Finally, 
section 6 presents a discussion on the main implications of our empirical results and 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Previous literature 
 
In the economic literature, earnings uncertainty (hereafter risk) has received considerable 
attention. Three different approaches have been proposed. The first and most widely used 
approach focuses on the effect of risk on human capital investment decisions. In their 
seminal work Levhari and Weiss (1974) use a two-period model of educational choice and 
find that earnings risk acts as a disincentive on the investment in human capital. Applying 
also a two-period model, Eaton and Rosen (1980) analytically confirm the results by 
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Levhari and Weiss, while Kodde (1986) rejects them empirically by observing the contrary 
effect. Using a the dynamic programming framework, Williams (1979) obtains that higher 
risk reduces the investment in human capital. Just the opposite conclusion is found by 
Hogan and Walker (2001) and Belzil and Hansen (2002). Hartog and Diaz-Serrano (2002) 
also analyse the effect of the stochastic post-school earnings on the optimal educational 
length. Their theoretical model predicts that increasing risk in future income should exert a 
negative effect on the individual’s educational length for risk-averse individuals and 
positive for “risk-lovers”. These forecasts are validated by empirical findings using Spanish 
data. 
 
The second approach establishes a link between the returns to schooling, as commonly 
defined in the Mincerian earnings equations, and risk. Low and Ormiston (1991) considered 
the firsts two moments (mean and variance) of the earnings distribution in the individual’s 
utility function, hence they allow the returns to education to vary with the individuals’ 
degree of risk aversion. They find that education has a positive impact on the variance of 
earnings, and the returns to education tend to decrease as the individual’s level of risk 
aversion increases. Their findings come close to the theory we maintain that individuals 
facing more risk in future incomes have greater expectations for higher earnings. Harmon, 
Hogan and Walker (2003) specify a Mincerian earnings equation and include a variation in 
the parameter associated to years of schooling. They consider returns to schooling as a 
random coefficient. Both works represent one step further in the estimation of the returns to 
schooling in a risky world, where individuals differ in their level of risk aversion. Neither 
Hogan et al nor Ormiston and Low attempt to measure risk compensation in wages, as we 
do here; moreover, Ormiston and Low use a very unattractive utility function, with the 
reservation premium for risk increasing in income and decreasing in risk.  
 
The third approach, in which the present work can be inserted, deals with risk compensation 
in wages. Although the literature on this subject is scarce and mainly focused on the US 
labour market, the empirical results are very consistent. Weiss (1972) was the first to 
consider the variance of earnings by educational levels and to correct the estimated rates of 
returns to schooling for different degrees of risk aversion. In a paper by King (1974) the 
standard deviation and skewness of earnings, computed by occupations, are regressed on 
the average earnings. The author finds that riskier occupations (higher variance in earnings) 
are associated with higher mean incomes. Using a six- year panel on hourly wages, 
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Feinberg (1981) accounts for the existence of compensating differentials for increased 
earnings-risk, measured as the individual’s intertemporal variations in earnings. He 
calculates the intertemporal coefficient of variation of individual earnings, and includes it as 
a covariate in a cross-sectional regression (last year of the panel). 
 
McGoldrick (1995) and McGoldrick and Robst (1996) also report significant compensating 
differentials for earnings uncertainty and penalty for skewness affection for men and 
women. McGoldrick’s (1995) work introduces an important novelty by distinguishing 
between systematic and unsystematic earnings. She estimates a two-step model. First, 
unsystematic earnings are estimated as the residuals of a standard Mincerian earnings 
equation that uses as regressors those variables that tend to create systematic variations in 
earnings (years of schooling, age or geographical location). Second, once systematic 
variations (variations not associated with earnings risk) are removed from earnings, the 
variance and skewness of the first-step residuals are included as regressors in a Mincer 
equation. Applying this technique to Spanish data, Diaz-Serrano (2001)2 finds significant 
risk compensation and skewness penalty. Hartog, Plug, Diaz-Serrano and Vieira (2003) 
obtain the same result for The Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Portugal. 
 
Our point of departure is the research on risk compensating differentials developed by 
Hartog and Vijverberg (2002), who support the empirical findings with a formal theoretical 
model. They test risk compensation and skewness affection in wages for the US labour 
market using a wide variety of measures derived from their theoretical model3 by using 
both reduced form and structural earnings equations. Christiansen and Nielsen (2002) 
analyse the risk-premium in wages using a Mean-Variance type of model, and thus establish 
a link between human capital and finance literature. They employ very detailed data on 
education (the same used here), which allows them to base the risk measure only on 
educational levels (110 cells). Using 11 years of Danish panel data, the authors find a 
positive and significant effect of risk on wages. However, they do not account for skewness 
affection, which is crucial in assessing the magnitude and the sign of the risk-premium. 
Using cross-country data, Pereira and Martins (2002) establish a positive link between risk 
as measured from quantile regressions and retu
 
2 Similar to King (1974), this author also concludes that individuals coming from wealthier families tend 
to choose riskier occupations (decreasing risk-aversion). 
3 All previous studies estimate risk using the standard formula of the variance in earnings or their 
estimated residuals from a Mincer equation.    
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3. Conceptual framework 
 
Our framework is similar to that presented in Hartog and Vijverberg (2002). Individuals 
face several schooling options and will only undertake them if they are sufficiently 
compensated. The basic Mincer earnings function allows for compensation for earnings 
postponement, under strict assumptions implying a constant mark-up for every additional 
year of schooling. In our approach we allow for the fact that individuals considering an 
education generally do not face some fixed income after completing a certain education. 
Instead they face an entire income distribution depending on the exact education which has 
been chosen. Thus, investing in schooling is a risky venture as an individual simply does 
not know where in this distribution she will end up. Risk averse individuals will want 
compensation for this risk. This risk premium will emanate from market supply reactions to 
the wage differential for options differing in earnings risk. Insufficient risk compensation 
will reduce supply of labour with that education and push up the wage, until equilibrium is 
established. 
 
To be more specific, assume individuals can choose between educations, equal in length, 
intrinsic attractivity, etc. During an education individuals accumulate human capital, but 
upon entering the education they do not know how much, as they do not know their aptitude 
for this education. The accumulation of human capital differs between individuals. 
Individuals know the parameters of the probability distribution for the amount of human 
capital at the end of the schooling period. After leaving school, their amount of human 
capital is public knowledge. 
 
There is a market for human capital that determines a market clearing price per efficiency 
unit of human capital for every education (human capital is heterogeneous across 
educations, homogeneous within educations). The supply of new human capital equals the 
probability distribution of human capital upon graduation, multiplied by the number of 
graduates. Total supply equals the supply of new human capital (new graduates) plus the 
predetermined stock of existing human capital. Demand, in units of human capital, is a 
declining function of the unit price. Equality of supply and demand of human capital 
determines the equilibrium unit price. The expected earnings in an education, at the moment 
of deciding on entering this education, are equal to expected level of human capital upon 
graduation multiplied by the unit price of human capital (actual earnings when graduating 
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are equal to realised level of human capital multiplied by the unit price). We can only have 
long run equilibrium if the difference in expected earnings in two educations matches the 
required compensation for differences in risk. This requires a particular supply of new 
entrants to an education. 
 
To simplify the exposition, suppose there are two options open to a potential student. The 
two educations are identical in all relevant aspects except for the distribution of human 
capital at the end of the education. Say education 2 has a greater variance of human capital 
upon graduation. With market clearing through equilibrium unit price operating for both 
educations, this translates into different variances of earnings for individuals contemplating 
the direction of their education. Assume all individuals are equally risk averse, implying 
some desired risk premium in the expected wage for education 2 relative to education 1. 
The realised wage differential between the two educations is determined by relative 
supplies of workers with the two educations. A shift from education 2 to education 1 will 
increase the unit price (wage) in education 2 and reduce the unit price in education 1 
(because both educations have declining demand curves for human capital), thus increasing 
the wage gap. A long-run equilibrium exists if supply is distributed over both educations in 
such a way that the bid prices from the demand curves generate a wage differential that 
individuals find exactly compensating for the difference in risk. 
 
So far, we only consider risk due to uncertainty about the output of the schooling process. 
In terms of earnings distribution this is an individual fixed effect or permanent risk: human 
capital produced in school is given for the rest of working life. Now, let’s add intertemporal 
risk. Suppose, for individuals with a given education there is some process of accumulating 
human capital during working life. Again, within an educational category, human capital is 
homogeneous. So, the market clearing unit price is determined at the intersection of the 
total demand curve for human capital of a given type and total supply: number of new 
graduates multiplied by mean level of human capital produced in school plus number of  
workers of each experience class multiplied by their level of human capital. Suppose the 
demand curve is shocked every year: the equilibrium value of a unit of human capital 
fluctuates randomly over time. Assume the parameters of this process are public 
knowledge. Then individuals embarking on an education know how much intertemporal 
variation in earnings they must anticipate. As before, they will take that into account when 
choosing their education, and only enter when the compensation for risk is sufficient. With 
a given stock of experienced workers, long-run equilibrium again obtains if the number of 
entrants leads to supplies that precisely uphold the wage gap requested as risk 
compensation.4 
 
We can derive the required compensation for risk from imposing equal expected lifetime 
utility for all educations. For the sake of exposition, we assume that there is one option that 
has fixed earnings in every year that an individual works. We ignore experience effects for 
individuals in all options. We will also ignore compensation for postponing earnings when 
going to school, as this is taken care of in the usual Mincer mark-up. 
 
Consider first the permanent effect from risky human capital production. In the riskless 
alternative, annual earnings are given as Yf , generating utility U(Yf ), where U( ) is a 
concave utility function with U’ > 0, U” < 0 and U’” > 0 (the latter condition is necessary 
for declining absolute risk aversion, see Tsiang, 1974 or Hartog and Vijverberg, 2002). In 
the risky option, income is a single draw for the rest of working life, written as Yr+  equal 
expected lifetime utility requires 
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 (1)  
where T is the length of working life and  the time discount rate. We can write the left-
hand side as  
 0 ( ) 1 ( )T t T1f fU Y e dt e U Y      (2)  
For the stochastic term on the right-hand side we apply a third-order Taylor expansion 
around the expected value fY , one order up from Pratt’s original contribution (Pratt, 1964), 
to  
  2 30 1 1 1( ) 1 '( ) ''( ) '''( )2 6T t Tr r r a r aU Y e dt e U Y U Y U Y              
 
(3) 
 
                                                 
4 Random fluctuation of the demand for human capital is only one way of generating intertemporal 
earnings risk. Stochastic production of human capital in on-the-job training and job search processes are 
alternatives. The precise underpinning of intertemporal risk is immaterial for our purpose, all we need is a 
foreseeable intertemporal earnings risk in an individual’s working life.  
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awhere   is the second moment (risk) and   is the third moment (skewness) of  around 
the expected value zero. Equating (2) and (3) and rewriting a little, after applying a first-
order Taylor expansion around Y  for (2), we get r
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where Vr is Arrow-Pratt’s relative risk aversion and Vs is the similar definition for relative 
skewness affection (we call it affection, because individuals like skewness; see Hartog and 
Vijverberg, 2002). With Vr and Vs positive by definition, we note from (4) that individuals 
will only enter an education if the permanent effect from unknown human capital 
production is matched by a positive premium for the risk (variance), while they allow an 
earnings drop for skewness. 
 
Let’s now consider the transitory component of risk. Again, let there be a riskless option, 
with earnings fixed at Yf for the rest of working life, and a stochastic option given by 
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We now take Yr as fixed: it’s the initial draw from the earnings distribution that contains the 
permanent effect discussed above5. Applying the same rules as above, we derive 
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(6) 
 
Just as for permanent shocks, individuals want compensation for the risk involved in the 
annual shocks   and are willing to pay for the skewness in the annual shocks  . So far, 
we have assumed that individuals only know the parameters of the distributions of human 
capital production in school and shifts in demand (equilibrium unit prices) over time. It is 
this risk they need to be compensated for. But suppose they would have full information 
over their individual fixed effect: individuals can perfectly predict how much human capital 
                                                 
5 Instead of annual shocks coming from the same distribution every year, we might make the distribution 
conditional on time or experience. We have decided to leave such complications for later work.   
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they will get out of the education, or, less demanding, they perfectly predict their ranking in 
the human capital distribution. In that case, the individual fixed effect entails no risk as 
individuals themselves simply know the realized value and not only the distribution they 
draw from. Hence they would require no compensation. Thus, including the fixed effect in 
an empirical analysis is a test on information: if individuals are sure of their position in the 
distribution upon graduation, they will not be compensated for the dispersion in that 
distribution, if they don’t know it, it will be a risk for them and they need such 
compensation. More generally we can say that the extent of compensation for permanent 
variability relative to transitory variability will reflect the relative degree of information that 
individuals have on their prospects, i.e a relative measure of risk versus individual 
heterogeneity6. Similarly, the correlation between the transitory and permanent variability 
would suggest whether the permanent variability might reflect foreseeable earnings risk. If 
the correlation is high, it is unlikely that the permanent variability just reflects individual 
heterogeneity.  
 
 
4. The data 
 
We use data collected by Denmark Statistics, which represents a 10 percent random sample 
of the Danish population aged between 16 and 75 over the period 1984-2000 (about 
500,000 individuals per year). The data contains detailed information on the individuals’ 
labour situation, occupation, education, social and family status. The variables we use in 
this study are real gross yearly earnings, age, occupation, industry, and the highest level of 
education attained. The education variable contains 1,750 different categories. Nevertheless, 
in order to have a representative number of individuals in each education cell, we group this 
variable in a new one with 75 categories. In order to avoid selectivity problems on female 
labour force participation we restrict our sample to male wage earners. We start by selecting 
those cohorts of working men who were aged between 30 and 40 in 1984. There are three 
reasons for imposing this age restriction. First, we avoid selectivity problems due to early 
retirement decisions. Second, we ensure that the selected individuals have already 
completed their educational process. And third, by excluding young workers entering the 
 
6 We owe this interpretation to Wim Vijverberg 
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labour market and individuals close to retirement we make sure that our measure of 
dispersion is more indicative of true structural dispersion for that education. 
 
We select only full-time workers (more than 30 hours per week) that have worked during 
the whole year. Unemployed and individuals out of the labor force are dropped from the 
sample for that year in order to focus on earnings risk rather than unemployment risk or 
labour market participation. Gross yearly earnings are the real annual individual labor 
earnings measured in DKK. We use the 2000 consumer price index to calculate individual 
real earnings. Table 1 describes the educational groups and provides some summary 
statistics. 
 
Insert table 1 
 
The panel data commonly used in the earnings literature are mainly based on social security 
or tax records. The most important advantage of these panels is the large sample size, and 
the basic limitation is the scarcity of demographic information. Our panel not only has the 
advantage of containing a large sample size, but also provides detailed demographic 
information. After applying the above mentioned filters we are left with a representative 
sample of about 30,000 individuals per year, of whom about 18,000 individuals are 
observed continuously every year between 1984 and 2000. Throughout this study we will 
use an unbalanced panel. Summary statistics of the different panel samples are presented in 
tables 2, 3 and 4. In table 2 we describe the entire sample. Table 3 provides detailed 
information about sample sizes by cohorts and the number of years that each cohort is 
observed. In table 4 we present statistics on the first three moments of the log-earnings 
distribution for each year in the panel. 
 
Insert table 2 
Insert table 3 
Insert table 4 
 
 
5. Estimation and results 
 
In this section we propose and estimate different measures of risk (hereafter R) and 
skewness (hereafter K). To test the existence of risk compensating differentials and 
skewness affection we use reduced form wage equations; we include these measures of R 
and K as regressors in a Mincer earnings equation7. Our estimation strategy divides this 
section in three parts. First, we estimate R and K and test compensation by using single-
years cross-sections. In this part, we take the 17 years panel of our data set as 17 different 
cross-sections. Second, we use our panel data to compute longitudinal measures of R and K 
and test the effect of both in the last year panel wages (2000). And third, also within the 
panel data context, we estimate R using different measures of earnings mobility and test 
compensation proceeding as in the second part. Throughout this section, we compute R and 
K using the wide range of types of education provided by our data set, aggregated into 75 
groups that allow us to get a representative sample in each education cell. 
 
 
5.1. Cross-section estimation 
 
In this part we estimate the different measures of R and K using the same data set 
containing the individual’s wages used to compute the Mincer earnings equations. Thus, as 
it is done in McGoldrick (1995), Hartog and Vijverberg (2002), and Hartog, Plug, Diaz-
Serrano and Vieira (2003) we proceed to calculate R and K by a quite straightforward two-
step procedure. We first estimate for each year separately the following cross-section log-
earnings equation 
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 (7) 
where the subscripts i and j denote individuals and the education cell where the individual 
belongs to respectively. Y is gross yearly real earnings measured in DKK. The matrix X 
contains a set of individual specific variables and dj are dummy variables for each education 
cell. The variables included in X are years of education, age and age squared. We use age 
instead of experience because of the exogenous nature of age. The education fixed-effects 
j are included in order to control for the effect of omitted variables that may bias our 
measures of risk and skewness within an education cell. We use the estimated residuals to 
compute the different measures of R and K. As in McGoldrick (1995), and Hartog, Plug, 
Diaz-Serrano, and Vieira (2003) we first consider the following measures for R and K  
 
7 Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) provide also structural equation estimates allowing for different 
assumptions on the utility function and for non-normal errors. They show that our specification is a good 
approximation to a proper structural equation. 
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(8) 
where eij is the exponential of the estimated residuals ij in equation (7). In (8), R and K are 
simply estimated as the second and third moment of the distribution of exp(j). In the 
second step we include estimated values for R and K in the following wage equation 
 
     
 
(9) 
where we expect that >0 and <0. Contrary to equation (7), in equation (9) we do not 
include dummies for education cells since R and K. are already fixed in a given education 
cell.  
 
The second way to measure R and K we consider is directly taken from Hartog and 
Vijverberg (2002). These measures are derived from their theoretical model and are defined 
by the following expressions 
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(10) 
where Y are the individual real gross yearly wages and 
 
2ˆˆexp
2
j
ij iY X
     
 
 
(11) 
ˆ 
ˆIn expression (11),   is the estimated parameter vector of equation (7). This vector also 
includes the education cells fixed-effects. And 2jˆ  is the estimated variance of the random 
disturbance term in equation (7) calculated over each education cell; with a log-normal 
distribution, (11) would be an exact expression for the mean. 
  
R(1) and K(1) are the second and third moment of the exponential of the residuals, whereas 
R(2) and K(2) are the relative variance and skewness, which fit better to the theoretical values 
of a  and a relative to the mean, as defined in expression (6)8. Although both ways to 
                                                 
8 See Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) for more details on the properties of measures R and K defined in 
(10). 
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measure R and K use different inputs, they provide similar outcomes. The coefficients of 
correlation between R(1) and R(2), and between K(1) and K(2) report values above 0,99 for the 
whole sample period (see table 5).  In table 5 we also report their mean and the standard 
deviation. We remark that in egalitarian Denmark the mean risk and skewness and their 
variation are quite low compared to those observed in the US9. However relative to the 
means the standard deviations report sufficient variability to search for effects of R and K 
on wages. Another remarkable fact is the increasing pattern reported by the mean and the 
standard deviation of R and K throughout the whole sample period; this may be related to 
the aging of the sample or to secular trends10.  
 
Insert table 5 
 
Results on the cross-section estimation of equation (9) for each year using the annual 
measures of R and K (1984 to 2000) are drawn in Figure 1. Besides R and K, in equation (9) 
we also include years of schooling, age, age squared, and dummies for occupation and 
industry. The patterns shown for  R(1) and R(2), and for K(1) and K(2) are identically shaped, 
which should not be surprising given the similar distributions and almost perfect 
correlations between R(1) and R(2), and between K(1) and K(2) reported in table 5. As the 
theory predicts, for all years we estimate highly significant effects of both risk and 
skewness on wages and with the expected signs, except for 1989 when skewness reports a 
non-significant effect. Thus, the estimates confirm that educations with higher risk in 
earnings offer higher mean incomes, whereas in those with more positively skewed 
distributions wages are slightly depressed. Results drawn in Figure 1 are summarized in 
table 6. For instance, a one unit increase in R(2) in a given education cell raises wages a 
maximum around 81% (1986) and a minimum around 17% (1998), with a mean effect of 
some 45%. A unit increase in K(2) depresses wages a maximum around 20% (1986) and a 
minimum around 0.6% (1999), with a mean effect of some 8%.  
 
Insert table 6 
 
 
9 Using the 1998 CPS data Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) report mean values around 0.6 and 3, and 
standard deviations of about 0.5 and 6 for estimated R and K respectively. 
10 We do not dig into this phenomenon since it is far from the objective of the present work, but we leave 
its exploration for further research. 
Although our cross section results are in accordance with what the theory predicts for each 
year of the sample period, such results are quite disperse. The dispersion in our results is 
due to the fact that R and K vary substantially over time; both variables display increasing 
mean and variance (see table 5)11. In table 7 and 8 we report the intertemporal correlations 
for R and K.. Correlations between two consecutive years tend to be very high, 0.9 and 
above, however such correlations tend to decrease systematically as the temporal gap 
between t and t+s increases.  
 
Insert table 7 
Insert table 8 
 
This evidence suggests that although systematic differences in R and K across education 
cells exist and are persistent throughout time, their annual measures are very variable. 
However, we think that educations differ in inherent, more structural levels of earnings 
variability, and that individuals tend to respond to the differences of a more long-run nature. 
Therefore, we believe that using a unique measure of R and K to estimate the effect of risk 
and skewness on wages in each separate cross-section is more appropriate, and it can 
provide more stable results. Thus, taking advantage of our long panel we propose now as 
alternative measures of R and K their mean values 
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Hence, we now use the same measure of R and K to estimate their effects on wages in each 
of our 17 cross-sections. By doing this we smooth possible error in the annual measures, so 
that we can look for a “cleaner” effect of R and K on wages. Results are drawn in figure 2. 
The estimated effects are now more stable than before (note the difference in scales). The 
gap between the maximum and the minimum risk-premium and skewness-penalty have 
been reduced drastically relative to the estimates provided by R(1), R(2), K(1) and K(2). For 
 
11 It is important to remark that although R and K vary substantially over time, their distributions are very 
stable in the sense that the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean (CV) displays small 
variation over time. 
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instance, now using expression (13), in an education cell where R(4) is one unit higher wages 
rise a maximum around 43% (2000) and the minimum increase observed is around 20% 
(1987), reducing the spread between maximum and minimum to about a third of its level 
using R (2). An increase in one unit in K(4) causes a maximum depression in wages around 
5% (2000) and a minimum around 0.7% (1987), cutting the spread in half. By using R(4) and 
K(4) the average effect on wages throughout the sample period are 28% and –2.5%, whereas 
by using R(2) and K(2) these average effects were 44.6% and –6.3% respectively. The inter-
temporal standard deviation of the risk-premium falls from 0.2 when R(2) is used to 0.05 for 
R(4). Such a remarkable fall of the dispersion also holds between K(2) and K(4) (see table 6). 
By applying the measures of R and K defined in (12) and (13) we observe a substantial 
improvement estimating the risk-premium and the skewness-penalty on wages, since they 
are more stable and homogeneous throughout time. The standard deviation of R(3), R(4), K(3) 
and K(4) is four times smaller than for R(1), R(2), K(1) and K(2).  
 
In future work we will dig deeper into the timing effects of compensation for earnings 
variability. For now, we just observe that the declining effects of R and K in the annual 
cross-sections may reflect a dominant settlement in early career years: over the sample 
period, the panel inevitable ages, and the early cross-sections are dominated by relatively 
inexperienced workers compensated for early earnings variability. The conceptual 
framework in section 3 pointed to supply reactions of entrants to educations and wage 
determination (per unit of human capital) when the entrants graduate. A relatively strong 
effect in early career years is compatible with this model. In later stages of the career other 
effects may become more important. However, precise testing requires a precise model of 
cohort and time effects and we will leave that for another occasion.  
 
The empirical results provided in this subsection are in accordance with the previous 
empirical evidence, thus we add Denmark to the selected list of countries for which the 
effects of risk and skewness on wages have been tested. However, in contrast to the 
previous literature, we base our measures of risk and skewness just on education cells, and 
not on occupations. This is an important improvement, as an education once completed is 
given and cannot be undone by selective exits as is the case with occupation cells.12.Our 
 
12 McGoldrick (1995) uses occupation cells and cross-section data for the US data. Hartog, Plug, Diaz-
Serrano and Vieira (2003) use occupation cells and cross-section data from Netherlands, Germany, Spain 
results are consistent, and at this point we can unambiguously confirm the existence of a 
compensating wage differentials for schooling risk in Denmark. However, there are still 
some issues related to the dynamics of earnings shocks and risk compensation that need to 
be disentangled. We face these issues in the next subsection.  
 
 
5.2. Permanent and transitory shocks in earnings 
 
One of the problems associated with using annual measures on R and K as commonly done 
in the literature, and as indeed we did in last subsection, is their sensitivity to measurement 
errors. Our 17 years panel allows us to look for a long-term measure of risk13, which 
averages the possible measurement errors affecting the annual measures of risk over time, 
as we did in the previous section. On the other hand, using a big panel as ours also allows to 
test for compensating wage differentials for schooling risk controlling for individual 
heterogeneity. Hence, shocks in earnings (residuals) can be decomposed into a permanent 
and a transitory component. In this subsection, we estimate a Mincer earnings equation 
using panel data estimation, and hence we decompose residuals between transitory and 
permanent shocks. We then  calculate separate measures of risk and skewness for both 
permanent and transitory shocks, and we include them in the pooled cross-section Mincer 
equation. Now, the model we use in the first stage is a panel data model with fixed-effects 
for individuals and education cells. The model is the following 
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where the subscript i indicates individuals, and j indicates the educational cell the individual 
belongs to. Y is real gross yearly earnings, and X is a set of explanatory variables. In 
equation (14) we decompose the disturbance term as  
 
    
                                                                                                                
 
where 
(15) 
                               
and Portugal. And Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) use education-occupation cells and cross-section data 
for the US.  
13 Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) emphasise the necessity of such a long-term measure to test risk 
compensation in wages in a more appropriate way. 
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The residual component ui is the time-invariant individual effect, j is the time-invariant 
education cell effect, and it is the time-variant residual effect. To our purpose controlling 
for heterogeneity across types of education is crucial. On one hand, this term picks up the 
effect of omitted variables that otherwise would “pollute” it, and hence also our measures 
of R and K on transitory shocks. And on the other hand, by considering j we ensure that 
total within-cell variance  holds for each education cell, where  is the 
variance of the permanent shocks and  is the variance of the transitory shocks. It allow 
us to get consistent estimates of the variance of the transitory shocks in earnings for each 
education cell . We estimate j by considering dummies for each education cell. To 
estimate model (14) we use the unbalanced panel design described in section 4. In order to 
isolate the time-invariant education effects j, we include dummies for each education cell, 
thus they are added to the set of explanatory variables in X (years of schooling, age and age 
squared). 
2

 
Once model (14) is estimated, we compute R and K separately for the exponential of the 
permanent shocks ui and the transitory shocks it, and we include them in earnings equation 
(9). To estimate model (14) we restrict the sample period from 1985 to 1999, whereas we 
leave the samples corresponding to the first (1984) and the last (2000) year of our sample 
period to estimate equation (9). Define i=exp(ui) and eit=exp(it), hence R and K for the 
permanent shocks in earnings are computed as  
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and for the transitory shocks 
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where in both (16) and (17) the subscript j indicates the education cell the individual 
belongs to14. Notice that in (17) R and K are somewhat of a longitudinal schooling risk and 
skewness. Controlling for education cells fixed effects implies that E(j)=0 but E(jt)0 
since we do not control for time-specific effects. This is the reason E(jt) enters in measures 
(17). In table 9 we report the basic results of the panel data estimation of equation (14)-(15). 
Table 10 reports some summary statistics on the distributions of Rp, Kp, Ra and Ka. These 
statistics reveal that once more R and K display sufficient variation across education types 
to look for effects on wages. Our first stage regression indicates that the variance of the 
permanent shock is much larger than the variance of the transitory shock. This is similar to 
what Chen (2003) reports for the United States 15. However, if we group the variances by 
education, we find that the average value of risk is smaller for permanent shocks than for 
transitory shocks, while the reverse holds for skewness.  
 
Insert table 9 
Insert table 10 
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As we mentioned previously, one of the roles of the education time invariant effects in 
expression (15) is to control for the potentially devastating effect of omitted variables, 
which could bias the estimates of Rp, Kp, Ra and Ka., In the second stage estimation, we 
cannot include fixed education effects. However, we can test whether R and K just pick up 
fixed effects, and possibly represent something else than earnings variability by regressing 
the time-invariant education effects on R and K :      
                                                
. If  R and K just 
represent fixed effects we would find =0 and =0. Results reported in table 11 confirms 
the absence of  this type of bias in Rp, Kp, Ra and Ka.  
 
Insert table 11 
Insert table 12 
 
14 We only use one specification for R (K), as table 5 shows perfect correlation between definitions (8) 
and (10). 
15 In the literature we can find some evidence on the variance of the permanent and transitory shocks in 
earnings by education levels (see e.g. Olson, White and Shefrin, 1979). However, there is no evidence 
about these shocks using detailed education types as we do here. Thus, we cannot contrast our results for 
Denmark extensively with those found in other countries. Alvarez, Browning and Ejrnaes (2003) provide 
a detailed analysis of patterns of individual earnings residuals in Denmark and find a large amount of 
individual heterogeneity in parameters for residual structures. Their approach is much too refined for our 
purpose; and certainly one could not expect compensation for all such heterogeneity.  
Formatted
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Estimations on equation (9) using R , K , R  and K  are reported in table 12. Model 1 and 2 
estimate risk-premium and skewness affection separately for permanent and transitory 
shocks, whereas model 3 includes simultaneously R and K of transitory and permanent 
shocks. We find that in both years 1984 and 2000, our measures of risk and skewness for 
transitory and permanent shocks in earnings are significant and with the expected signs. 
This significance of R and K in both years separated by so wide an interval confirms that 
our findings are quite stable. Thus, they also confirm that risk is an intrinsic long-run 
feature of the human capital investments. For instance, taking the results in 2000 for model 
1 and 2, we estimate that a one percent increase in risk is associated with 0.06% higher 
earnings when it comes from permanent shocks, and 0.19% higher earnings when it comes 
from transitory shocks. The effects of skewness for both types of shocks display a very 
similar intensity, and depression in wages are around 0.005% for both types of shocks. In 
model 3, all the effects are also very significant but with a small fall in their intensity, 
however these latter results have to be taken with caution due to the correlations between 
Rp, Kp, Ra and Ka, see table 13.16 The fact that the two types of variability are correlated 
may be seen as a further indication that the permanent component is not just individual 
heterogeneity. Why would educations with a high level of individual heterogeneity (e.g. 
ability) systematically also be characterized by a high level of transitory risk? It is more 
plausible that the high level of correlation reflects that some educations are affected by both 
permanent income shocks, for instance the scarring effect of graduating in a recession, and 
transitory business cycle effects on earnings. 
 
Insert table 13 
 
Our results on compensating wage differentials for schooling risk reveal that transitory 
shocks in earnings play a more important role than permanent shocks. Permanent variability 
is less compensated for transitory shocks, which means that those shocks are partly 
associated with individual heterogeneity or ability. To the extent that this information is 
better known by an individual entering an education than the future transitory shocks, the 
required compensation for such type of risk should be smaller. Hence, the result of a smaller 
compensation for permanents shocks is consistent with individuals being better informed on 
 
16 Using a rule of thumb that the correlation between regressors should not exceed 0.9, only 
the correlation between permanent risk and skewness constitutes a serious multicollinearity 
problem. 
permanent shocks, as they contain individual heterogeneity on which individuals are better 
informed than the researcher.  
 
 
5.3. Earnings mobility and transitory risk 
 
Both in this paper and in earlier papers, we have established a premium on wages to 
compensate for the differential earnings risk associated with different educations. To 
measure earnings risk, we calculated statistics from earnings function residuals grouped by 
education. Thus we are vulnerable to the critique that such measures do not adequately 
measure risk. To meet this critique, we now deal with risk measures based on earnings 
mobility. We argue that the extent of movement of individuals through the earnings 
distribution is a good measure of transitory risk. In this subsection we use two different 
types of earnings mobility measures. The first set is based on earnings time-dependence 
(coefficient of rank correlation over time and minus-chi squared statistic), and the second 
one is based on individual earnings positional movement (quantile mobility ratio and per-
capita quantile movement). Define eit=exp(it), where it are the transitory shocks in 
earnings estimated from equation (14). We compute earnings mobility with a time gap of 5 
years, 1985-1990, 1986-1991, and so on. The definition of the selected mobility measures 
applied over eit are: 
 
A. Time-dependence measures  
 
A1. We define the coefficient of rank correlation () as 
 
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where the subscript j denotes the education cell the individual belongs to, rij(t) is the 
individual’s ranking position in the transitory earnings distribution at year t, and rij(t+5) is 
the individual’s ranking position at year t+5. The rank correlation determines time-
dependence, so that we take as time-independence 1-j. After calculating the T-5 possible 
rank correlations for all our sample period we average them throughout time for each 
education cell 
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Expression (19) increases with earnings mobility: a higher value represents greater earnings 
risk, as the ranking in a given year has less predictive power for the ranking five years later. 
 
A2. The minus chi-squared statistic is defined as  
  lkj ptt )1.0()5,( 2,2
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Where pk,l is the probability to move from quantile k in year t to quantile l in year t+5, and 
being kl. To estimate pk,l we use a quintile transition matrix between t and t+5,  averaged 
throughout time 
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In (21) we change the sign in order to reflect time-independence. Thus, the coefficient rises 
with earnings mobility: a higher value represents a higher risk, as there is more movement 
between the quantiles of the distribution. 
 
B. Positional mobility measures 
 
B1. We define the quantile mobility ratio Qkl(t,t+5)=1-Qk=l(t,t+5), which is computed by a 
quantile transition matrix on earnings transitory shocks, as the fraction of individuals that 
do not remain in the same quantile between period t and t+5. This index reflects instability. 
We distinguish between upward fluctuations Qk<l(t,t+5) and downward fluctuations 
Qk>l(t,t+5), where k is the quintile where the individual is allocated in year t, and l is the 
same concept for year t+5. Once all the transition matrixes have been computed for each 
education cell we average these indexes throughout time. We use as quantiles the deciles 
and quartiles.  
 
B2. We define the per capita quantile mobility as 
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Where Qij(t) is the quantile of the earnings distribution where the individual is located in 
year t, and Qij(t+5) is his quantile location in year t+5. We compute these indices by each 
education cell and average them over time. We use deciles and the index rises with earnings 
mobility. 
 
In this subsection we follow the same strategy as before. Once all these movement measures 
on eij have been computed for each education cell, we include each of them separately in a 
Mincer wage equation to test for compensating wage differentials for schooling risk. To 
compute transition matrixes and intertemporal rankings on eit we use the panel covering the 
period 1995-1999, whereas to look for risk compensation we use again the first (1984) and 
last (2000) of our panel. As we mention above, the mobility and time-dependence measures 
used here are averaged over time. The results of the augmented Mincer equations are 
reported in table 13. Besides the earnings mobility measure, the earnings equations also 
include years of schooling, age, age squared, and dummies for occupation and industry. To 
make the results comparable we calculate the risk-wage elasticity for each mobility 
measure. 
 
Insert table 14 
 
To make our results in accordance with theory, all coefficients should be positive, except 
those for immobility. Note first of all that all our new measures , with very similar 
magnitudes in both years 1984 and 2000. For instance, concerning the results in 2000, one 
percent increase in the rank correlation variable in a given education cell rises wages about 
0.07%, whereas for the minus chi-squared and per-capita decile movement statistic such 
increment in wages is about 0.13% and 0.005%. The theoretical predictions are supported 
for the measures based on rank correlation, immobility (quartiles and deciles) and per capita 
decile movement. Disturbing results derive from the distinction between upward and 
downward movement: one would have expected the signs to be reversed, as downward 
movement is generally considered as undesirable and upward movement may be hailed as a 
boon. The negative sign for the chi-squared measure is also disturbing. These results 
necessitate further reflection on the extent to which they are damaging to the thesis that the 
labour market provides compensation for wage risk.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we contribute with new empirical evidence to the emerging literature on risk 
compensation in wages. To do this we use a 17 years panel containing 10% of the Danish 
population, and with a very detailed description of the educational attainment of the Danes. 
The qualities of our data set allow an in-depth analysis of the intrinsic return-risk trade-off 
associated with schooling choices. Our main contribution relative to the previous literature 
is to focus on two aspects. First, we base our estimations on compensating wage 
differentials on risk measures that employ education cells only, whereas the previous 
evidence also relies on occupation cells. And second, we incorporate an intertemporal 
dimension to the post-schooling risks. We are able to distinguish transitory and permanent 
earnings risk. We find that both permanent and transitory risk are associated with 
compensationg differentials, but that transitory shocks in earnings is much more relevant for 
compensating wage differentials than the permanent shocks. Encouraged by this latter result 
and given the dynamic nature of the transitory shocks in earnings, we also experiment with 
tests of risk compensation using new measures of risk based on fluctuations in transitory 
earnings. So far, we find mixed results: support but also rejections. 
 
The new dynamic dimension introduced here fills a gap that previous evidence could not 
cover. We have experimented with permanent measures of risk rather than only 
contemporaneous ones. Clearly, these new permanent measures based on panel data catch 
the intrinsic long-run feature of the post-schooling risk and the required compensation for it. 
Our results are mostly in accordance with what theory predicts, though not for all risk 
measures. From our results we can derive some important implications. First, while some 
previous literature has revealed the important role of the length of education in the risk-
return trade-off, we find that not only the length but also the type of education plays a 
crucial role in this sense. And second, more risk-averse individuals facing a lower degree of 
risk will experience lower wage growth or even wage stagnation if they display strong 
preference for positively skewed wage distributions. 
 
This horizontal dimension in the schooling choices we introduce here should be taken in to 
account for a proper research on individuals’ curricula design and their returns. Hence, 
further research in this line is encouraged. Immediate extensions of our research would be 
to allow for selective choice of educations and test whether this is as important as many 
 24
believe, and to allow for the drop-out risk. There are also many new fields in this area 
waiting to be ploughed.  
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Annex of tables and figures 
 
Table1: Description of the education cells (Gross yearly real wages – averaged by 
education cell and over time 1984-2000) 
Level of 
education Type of education 
Years 
school 
Sample 
size Mean Varian. Skew. Min. Max.
Basic School, 7 years 7 4779 12.413 0.076 0.531 11.589 14.709Primary 
 Basic School, 9 years 9 2260 12.501 0.110 0.861 11.592 14.785
Preparatory School 10 786 12.708 0.184 0.386 11.603 14.599High school 
High School 12 41 12.464 0.138 0.621 11.704 13.448
Appr. General Business 12 1922 12.562 0.119 0.886 11.603 14.593Vocational 
training Appr. Shop Assistant 12 167 12.580 0.112 0.941 11.680 13.970
 Appr. Wholesale Shop Assistant 12 1087 12.692 0.122 0.652 11.608 14.335
 Appr. Office Clerk 12 685 12.781 0.090 0.572 11.671 14.453
 Appr. Bank Office Clerk 12 90 12.877 0.113 -0.213 11.854 13.915
 Appr. IT Office Clerk 12 518 12.396 0.080 0.115 11.601 13.642
 Appr. Builder 12 899 12.445 0.070 0.372 11.604 13.927
 Appr. Carpenter 12 613 12.425 0.063 0.350 11.611 13.635
 Appr. Joiner 12 336 12.495 0.063 0.118 11.631 13.421
 Appr. Plumbing 12 490 12.421 0.066 0.285 11.618 13.585
 Appr. Painter 12 700 12.541 0.061 0.126 11.633 13.626
 Appr. Electrician  12 84 12.420 0.104 1.603 11.647 14.102
 Appr. Construction and Pavor 12 1111 12.490 0.062 0.266 11.605 13.783
 Appr. Metal  12 31 12.480 0.067 -0.254 11.838 13.028
 Appr. Jeweller 12 1368 12.535 0.070 0.588 11.606 13.918
 Appr. Fitter 12 1616 12.490 0.067 0.483 11.605 14.104
 Appr. Mechanics 12 314 12.663 0.095 0.190 11.688 13.652
 Appr. Electronics Mechanics 12 49 12.563 0.058 0.878 12.067 13.377
 Appr. IT Mechanics 12 98 12.432 0.092 1.029 11.666 13.832
 Appr. Misc. Iron, Metal 12 484 12.718 0.087 0.207 11.639 14.047
 Appr. Graphic 12 35 12.643 0.191 0.125 11.778 13.456
 Appr. Photography 12 275 12.524 0.104 0.391 11.615 13.821
 Appr. Misc. Technical 12 145 12.537 0.116 0.497 11.668 13.732
 Appr. Service 12 426 12.516 0.079 0.360 11.647 13.716
 Appr. Dairyman, Butcher 12 236 12.443 0.070 0.572 11.675 13.698
 Appr. Baker 12 263 12.491 0.092 0.180 11.623 13.587
 Appr. Cook, Waiter and Food 12 123 12.375 0.082 -0.226 11.646 13.094
 Appr. Agriculture 12 147 12.416 0.052 -0.205 11.676 13.048
 Appr. Gardener and Forestry 12 80 12.433 0.129 0.581 11.666 13.495
 Appr. Fishing and Agriculture 12 93 12.506 0.089 0.558 11.698 13.551
 Appr. Transport 12 77 12.396 0.050 0.221 11.747 13.137
 Appr. Dental Assistant and Health Care 12 42 12.614 0.099 -0.069 11.830 13.329
SCHE Education and Language 14 57 12.629 0.134 0.629 11.833 13.654
SCHE Music, Aesthetics and Social Sc. 14 63 12.637 0.114 0.366 11.850 13.618
SCHE Laboritry Assistant and Graphic 14 736 12.642 0.088 0.050 11.621 14.086
Post 
secondary 
(non 
university) 
SCHE Mish. Technical 14 43 12.697 0.108 0.817 11.999 13.743
 SCHE Food 14 54 12.506 0.075 -0.110 11.745 13.245
 SCHE Agriculture, Fishing and Transport 14 48 12.518 0.073 0.827 11.843 13.446
 SCHE Miscelaneous 14 48 12.476 0.175 1.487 11.938 13.680
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Table 1: continuation 
Level of 
education Type of education 
Years 
school
Sample 
Size Mean Varian. Skew. Min. Max.
 SCHE Health Care 14 324 12.602 0.025 0.687 11.865 13.499
 SCHE Police, Warder 14 39 12.678 0.042 1.439 12.400 13.252
 SCHE Armed Forces 14 401 12.474 0.051 -0.065 11.627 13.335
MCHE Educator 16 1382 12.613 0.037 0.355 11.628 13.777Higher 
education 
short cycle MCHE School or Needlework Teacher 
16 
91 12.911 0.100 0.531 11.930 14.276
 MCHE Journalism 16 54 12.542 0.060 -0.433 11.760 13.168
 MCHE Business Language 16 83 12.511 0.053 -0.222 11.755 13.115
 MCHE Social Worker 16 789 12.992 0.094 0.264 11.726 14.526
 MCHE Engineering 16 525 12.828 0.109 -0.084 11.676 14.230
 MCHE Misc. Technical 16 370 12.757 0.075 -0.214 11.683 13.747
 MCHE Agriculture, Fishing and Transport 16 69 12.555 0.048 0.251 11.904 13.236
 MCHE Midwife, Radiologist, Nursery, 
Physiotherapist etc.  
16 
114 13.075 0.258 0.697 11.833 14.907
 BA Natural Sciences, Humanities and 
Social Sc. 
16 
44 12.736 0.092 -1.013 11.842 13.203
MA Education and Humanities 18 63 12.749 0.073 -0.226 11.862 13.530
MA Theology 18 110 12.722 0.086 -0.656 11.785 13.423
Higher 
education 
long cycle MA History, Archaeology 18 66 12.658 0.108 -1.004 11.701 13.248
 MA Literature, Arts, Music, Aesthetics 18 154 12.752 0.082 -0.616 11.757 13.675
 MA Business Language 18 47 12.982 0.129 0.610 12.082 14.051
 MSc IT, Math, Statistics 18 81 12.939 0.102 -0.036 11.833 14.093
 MSc Physics, Astronomy, Chemestry 18 118 12.780 0.086 -0.085 11.764 13.832
 MSc Geology, Geography, Biology, 
Sports 
18 
125 13.145 0.170 0.356 11.916 14.509
 MSc Economics 18 179 13.061 0.125 0.105 11.859 14.296
 MA Law (LLM) 18 122 12.884 0.084 -0.471 11.783 13.702
 MA Political Sciences, Sociology 18 197 13.027 0.202 0.424 11.758 14.685
 MA Misc. Social Sciences 18 303 13.091 0.123 -0.198 11.761 14.488
 MSc Engineering 18 176 12.752 0.092 -0.724 11.677 13.642
 MA Architecture (MAA) 18 84 12.872 0.084 0.374 11.907 14.005
 MA Food 18 266 13.159 0.078 -1.217 11.756 13.890
 Msc Medicine 18 57 12.950 0.125 -0.450 11.973 13.748
 MSc Dentistry, Pharmacy 18 69 12.918 0.161 0.696 11.891 14.246
 Msc MA 18 434 13.039 0.215 0.235 11.649 14.741
PhD PhD. 20 102 13.046 0.096 0.192 12.042 13.993
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics on selected variables 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Log-wage 12.586 0.354 11.561 15.633
Years of schooling 12.125 3.145 7 20
Age 42.882 5.769 30 56
Age-squared 1872,144 496,633 900 3136
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Table 3: Description of the sample by birth cohorts 
Birth year 
Total 
sample 
size 
Number 
of years 
observed 
Sample 
size percentage
Age in 
1984
Age in 
2000
1944 3,332 up to 9 882 26% 40 56
  10 to 16 998 30%
  17 1,452 44%
1945 3,647 up to 9 936 26% 39 55
  10 to 16 1,107 30%
  17 1,604 44%
1946 3,866 up to 9 1,008 26% 38 54
  10 to 16 1,175 30%
  17 1,683 44%
1947 3,971 up to 9 922 23% 37 53
  10 to 16 1,232 31%
  17 1,817 46%
1948 3,903 up to 9 916 23% 36 52
  10 to 16 1,227 31%
  17 1,760 45%
1949 3,733 up to 9 876 23% 35 51
  10 to 16 1,198 32%
  17 1,659 44%
1950 3,610 up to 9 804 22% 34 50
  10 to 16 1,147 32%
  17 1,659 46%
1951 3,673 up to 9 846 23% 33 49
  10 to 16 1,168 32%
  17 1,659 45%
1952 3,619 up to 9 800 22% 32 48
  10 to 16 1,160 32%
  17 1,659 46%
1953 3,654 up to 9 858 23% 31 47
  10 to 16 1,137 31%
  17 1,659 45%
1954 3,662 up to 9 844 23% 30 46
  10 to 16 1,159 32%
  17 1,659 45%
All Cohorts 40,670 up to 9 9,692 24% 30 56
  10 to 16 12,708 31%
  17 18,270 45%
 30
 
 
Table 4: Description of the sample by year (Y: real log-wage) 
 Sample Analysis Individuals aged 30-56 
  Unbalanced panel design Balanced panel design     
   
Log gross yearly labour 
earnings y  
Log gross yearly labour 
earnings y  
Log gross yearly labour 
earnings y 
Year Sample Ages N Mean Var Skewness N Mean Var Skewness N Mean Var Skewness
1984 30-40 31,504 12.49 0.095 0.532 17,713 12.52 0.074 0.708 62,913 12.49 0.111 0.585
1985 31-41 32,307 12.50 0.103 0.551 17,713 12.54 0.077 0.902 65,083 12.48 0.115 0.609
1986 32-42 32,540 12.53 0.105 0.626 17,713 12.57 0.079 0.996 66,906 12.51 0.114 0.599
1987 33-43 32,268 12.57 0.111 0.593 17,713 12.62 0.085 0.931 67,468 12.54 0.119 0.595
1988 34-44 31,432 12.59 0.111 0.652 17,713 12.64 0.088 0.952 67,599 12.56 0.119 0.586
1989 35-45 31,196 12.58 0.118 0.643 17,713 12.63 0.093 0.966 67,700 12.54 0.123 0.562
1990 36-46 30,723 12.59 0.120 0.698 17,713 12.63 0.097 0.985 68,040 12.54 0.126 0.578
1991 37-47 30,417 12.59 0.123 0.637 17,713 12.64 0.099 0.933 68,691 12.54 0.129 0.490
1992 38-48 30,130 12.60 0.125 0.628 17,713 12.65 0.100 0.971 69,278 12.55 0.129 0.464
1993 39-49 29,469 12.59 0.129 0.635 17,713 12.65 0.102 0.882 68,916 12.54 0.131 0.435
1994 40-50 29,745 12.61 0.135 0.671 17,713 12.67 0.106 1.000 70,066 12.56 0.131 0.534
1995 41-51 29,782 12.61 0.135 0.786 17,713 12.68 0.108 1.092 71,802 12.57 0.129 0.603
1996 42-52 29,656 12.62 0.137 0.764 17,713 12.68 0.109 1.083 72,531 12.57 0.131 0.604
1997 43-53 29,603 12.62 0.136 0.777 17,713 12.69 0.109 1.116 74,228 12.58 0.129 0.602
1998 44-54 29,586 12.63 0.142 0.817 17,713 12.69 0.115 1.121 76,496 12.59 0.134 0.642
1999 45-55 29,350 12.64 0.141 0.844 17,713 12.70 0.114 1.164 77,281 12.61 0.135 0.667
2000 46-56 29,225 12.63 0.143 0.875 17,713 12.70 0.117 1.129 77,839 12.61 0.137 0.726
1984-2000 30-56 518,933 12.586 0.1253 0.728 301,121 12.64 0.101 1.037 1,192,837 12.55 0.128 0.592
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Table 5: Summary statistics for R(1), R(2), K(1) and K(2). 
   
 
Pearson 
Correlation  R(1) R(2) K(1) K(2) 
 R(1). R(2) K(1). K(2) Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
1984 0.999 0.999 0.103 0.075 0.094 0.063 0.127 0.265 0.108 0.210 
1985 0.999 0.999 0.106 0.068 0.097 0.058 0.121 0.219 0.103 0.178 
1986 0.999 0.998 0.114 0.078 0.103 0.066 0.147 0.288 0.123 0.226 
1987 0.999 0.998 0.117 0.077 0.105 0.064 0.143 0.273 0.119 0.214 
1988 0.999 0.998 0.117 0.077 0.106 0.064 0.146 0.263 0.122 0.204 
1989 0.999 0.998 0.119 0.075 0.107 0.062 0.136 0.245 0.113 0.188 
1990 0.999 0.999 0.122 0.091 0.109 0.074 0.165 0.443 0.135 0.326 
1991 0.999 0.999 0.122 0.088 0.109 0.073 0.160 0.408 0.133 0.313 
1992 0.999 0.996 0.130 0.102 0.116 0.082 0.202 0.487 0.165 0.363 
1993 0.999 0.999 0.137 0.117 0.121 0.093 0.244 0.655 0.196 0.489 
1994 0.999 0.999 0.150 0.142 0.132 0.112 0.310 1.140 0.241 0.805 
1995 0.999 0.998 0.155 0.137 0.137 0.110 0.341 1.068 0.270 0.772 
1996 0.996 0.996 0.160 0.145 0.139 0.113 0.352 1.148 0.276 0.820 
1997 0.997 0.998 0.160 0.151 0.139 0.114 0.325 1.159 0.249 0.790 
1998 0.998 0.997 0.164 0.141 0.144 0.110 0.350 0.987 0.276 0.692 
1999 0.998 1.000 0.170 0.151 0.150 0.126 0.677 3.467 0.549 2.797 
2000 0.998 0.997 0.179 0.128 0.157 0.105 0.433 0.878 0.353 0.701 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of annual estimation of equation (9) 
 Mean  Std. dev Minimum Maximum
R(1) 0.3806 0.1659 0.1641 0.7043
K(1) -0.0627 0.0534 -0.1663 -0.0051
R(2) 0.4466 0.1977 0.1705 0.8132
K(2) -0.0775 0.0672 -0.2018 -0.0067
R(3) 0.2412 0.0479 0.1626 0.3755
K(3) -0.0204 0.0106 -0.0448 -0.0067
R(4) 0.2813 0.0551 0.1944 0.4368
K(4) -0.0247 0.0126 -0.0541 -0.0089
Sample size   94,000 106,000
 
 Figure 1: Annual estimation of risk premium and skewness affection using annual 
measures 
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Figure 2: Annual estimation of risk premium and skewness affection using annual 
measures averaged over time. 
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(1) (2)Table 7: Intertemporal correlations between R  and R  
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1985 0.95                
1986 0.95 0.96               
1987 0.88 0.89 0.93              
1988 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.96             
1989 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.94 0.96            
1990 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.94          
1991 0.85 0.80 0.86 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.96         
1992 0.76 0.71 0.79 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.97        
1993 0.70 0.65 0.72 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.95 0.98       
1994 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96      
1995 0.73 0.69 0.75 0.80 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.97     
1996 0.78 0.72 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.94     
1997 0.74 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.90 0.93    
1998 0.77 0.73 0.76 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.94   
1999 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.66 
2000 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.61 0.60 0.64 0.77 0.61
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Intertemporal correlations between K(1) and K(2) 
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1985 0.95                
1986 0.94 0.95               
1987 0.90 0.92 0.96              
1988 0.85 0.84 0.90 0.84             
1989 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.85 0.92            
1990 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.86 0.94           
1991 0.85 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.94 0.98          
1992 0.75 0.68 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.94         
1993 0.80 0.75 0.82 0.86 0.81 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.94        
1994 0.81 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.88 0.92       
1995 0.79 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.87 0.94 0.93 0.85 0.89 0.97      
1996 0.77 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.84 0.93 0.95     
1997 0.80 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.77 0.84 0.94 0.92 0.83 0.88 0.97 0.93 0.92    
1998 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.83 0.91 0.89 0.81 0.83 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.97   
1999 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.23  
2000 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.61 0.11
 
 
 
Table 9: Basic results for fixed-effects model (11) 
 Coefficient t-statistic
Years of schooling 0.0722 9.4
Age 0.0443 65.24
Age-squared -0.0004 -54.96
2
u  0.323  
2
e
2 

 2u 2e
 0.161  
u /( + ) 0.67  
R2 0.121  
Number of individuals 39,399  
Number of observations 458,204  
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Summary statistics for R and K. 
 Permanent shocks Transitory shocks 
 R K R K
Mean 0.1483 0.5195 0.3027 0.0372
Stand. Dev. 0.3080 3.1852 0.1086 0.1082
Percentiles     
10th 0.0313 0.0044 0.1990 -0.0086
25th 0.0500 0.0137 0.2336 0.0020
50th 0.0737 0.0383 0.2810 0.0134
75th 0.1390 0.1215 0.3413 0.0348
90th  0.2634 0.4679 0.4444 0.0767
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Omitted variable bias test 
 Model 1 Model 2
Risk (PS) -0.275 
(-1.46) 
Skewness (PS) 0.017 
(0.97) 
Risk (TS)  1.557 
(0.74)
Skewness (TS)  -3.549 
(-1.49)
TS: Transitory shocks; PS=Permanent shocks 
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Table 12: Estimation of equation (9) using transitory and permanent shocks 
 1984 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Risk (PS) 0.3426 
(16.85) 
0.0485 
 
0.2791
(10.93)
0.0395
0.4743 
(20.10) 
0.0672
0.2838 
(9.41) 
0.0403 
Skewness (PS) -0.0256 
(-10.01) 
-0.0041 
 
-0.0132
(-3.50)
-0.0021
-0.0362 
(-11.96) 
-0.0058
-0.0218 
(-4.83) 
-0.0035 
Risk (TS)  3.8468 
(13.59) 
0.1142
1.4827
(4.18)
0.0445
6.3753 
(20.21) 
0.1912
4.0249 
(10.00) 
0.1207 
Skewness (TS)  -0.8047 
(-2.33) 
-0.0027
-2.4304
(-3.86)
-0.0082
-1.5514 
(-3.64) 
-0.0053
-1.6788 
(-2.26) 
-0.0057 
TS: Transitory shocks; PS: Permanent shocks. 
t-values in parentheses 
Elasticity in italic 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Correlations between risk and skewness for TS and PS 
 Risk (PS) Skewness (PS) Risk (TS) 
Skewness (PS) 0.9192   
Risk (TS) 0.5940 0.4790  
Skewness (TS) 0.7521 0.7473 0.6490 
TS: Transitory shocks; PS: Permanent shocks. 
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 Table 14: Estimation of equation (9) using transitory earnings mobility measures 
 1984 2000 
 Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Rank correlation (1-) 0.0526 
(4.94)
0.074 0.0496 
(4.09)
0.070 
Mobility quartile ratio   
Immobility: Qk=l(t,t+5) -0.0030 
(-2.11)
-0.083 -0,0102 
(-6.33)
-0.282 
Downward mobility: 1-Qk>l(t,t+5) -0.0120 
(-7.75)
-0.420 -0.0062 
(-3.49)
-0.217 
Upward mobility: 1-Qk<l(t,t+5) 0.0218 
(11.95)
0.813 0.0275 
(12.77)
1.026 
Mobility decile ratio  
Immobility: Qk=l(t,t+5) -0.0058 
(-2.85)
-0.069 -0.0130 
(-5.43)
-0.156 
Downward mobility: 1-Qk>l(t,t+5) -0.0108 
(-7.76)
-0.459 -0.0054 
(-3.48)
-0.229 
Upward mobility: 1-Qk<l(t,t+5) 0.0170 
(10.91)
0.773 0.0144 
(8.02)
0.655 
-2 -0.1094 
(-4.62)
0.087 -0.1648 
(-6.17)
0.131 
Per-capita decile mobility 0.0114 
(3.19)
0.006 0.0010 
(2.29)
0.005 
Sample size 31,504 29,226 
 
 
 
